intelligence or ability or because of any complications arising
out of the charge and a lack of familiarity with minimal essentials
of criminal procedure. In the absence of these allegations we
originally denied the writ on the authority of Betts v. Brady,
316 U. S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595. As noted by the
United States Court in its opinion in the instance case, there is
a marked factual similarity between this case and Betts. In view
of the Betts precedent which we have followed since its announce-
ment in 1941, we felt obligated to follow its pronouncements in
this instance. In consequence of this view, we initially concluded
that the petition was fatally insufficient to motivate the issuance
of a post-conviction writ. Johnson v. Mayo, 158 Fla. 264, 28 So.
2d 585, cert. den. 329 U.S. 804, 67 S. Ct. 492, 91 L. Ed. 687.
By its instant opinion the Supreme Court of the United
States has expressly receded from the long-established rule
announced in Betts v. Brady, supra. We are now confronted with
the responsibility of taking note of the belatedly recognized
federal organic right to counsel authoritatively announced by the
United States Supreme Court in its Gideon opinion.
In order to meet this judicial responsibility we have
promptly undertaken to establish appropriate procedures that will
accord to prisoners an effective forum in which they may expedi-
tiously obtain a hearing and any relief to which they might be
entitled. We have taken judicial cognizance of the large number
of felons incarcerated in the state prison who potentially have
claims to relief because of absence of counsel at the time of their
trial and conviction. The task of reviewing these claims, if and
when asserted, appeared to be of such magnitude that it was essential
to establish an effective procedural remedy that would distribute the
judicial responsibility, while simultaneously according to the pris-
oner an expeditious and complete opportunity to obtain relief. Roy
v. Wainwright ____So. 2d ____Opinion field April 10, 1963.